In this paper, author tried to find relation of foreign direct investment inflows with its determinants like growth rate, interest rate, exchange rate, inflation rate, fiscal deficit, openness in India during 1971-2015 through causality, co-integration and vector error correction models. In this paper, it was attempted to explain clearly that how foreign direct investment inflows and outflows have changed during several financial crises in different regions of the world since 1970s in support with a historical analysis over global financial crises. The paper concludes that FDI inflows in India has been catapulting at the rate of 21.56% per year during 1971-2015 and exponentially at the rate of 0.6044% per year significantly. It has four upward structural breaks in 1985, 1994, 2000 and 2006 respectively during the specified period. FDI inflows in India has causal relation uni-directionally with fiscal deficit, and bi-directionally with inflation, exchange rate, interest rate and growth rate during 1971-2015.Johansen co-integration test confirmed that Trace Statistic contains four co-integrating equations and Max Eigen Statistic has three co-integrating equations. VECM is stable, non-stationary and not good fit for four estimated equations and error corrections for the equations of change of interest rate and inflation rate showed significant with speeds of 23% and 103% per year. The paper also concludes that FDI does not cause Granger financial crises, but financial crises do cause Granger FDI. 
Introduction
Foreign Direct Investment has several dimensions. It affects host countries' balance of payments and development process. It has long run effects on economic growth and sustainable development which depend on the character of FDI. However, the nexus between growth and FDI is indeterminate since it varies from region to region, country to country and from period to period although the globalization, liberalization and privatization drives accelerated the speed of the nexus towards positive direction irrespective of the distribution of income. Historically, FDI changes from merchants' capital to multinational investments, from imperialistic attitude to trade domination through economic integration (via financial integration) in international trade and finance.
FDI does not cause crises directly, but it has indirect causes of bubbles and busts. Debt finance through FDI may stimulate debt burden under recession. Financial and banking crises may emerge if FDI in banking sector find losses and shut downs. Yet we cannot avoid the fact that FDI does not Granger cause of financial crises but financial crises do Granger cause FDI changes which were observed in all the financial crises in the world.
Since the Baring crisis in 1870, India's FDI was dominated by British imperialism through East India Company whose chief competitors were Dutch East India Company, Danish East India Company, Portuguese East India Company, French East India Company and Swedish East India Company respectively. In 1913, India's foreign investment stood 35% of GDP and per capita foreign investment was 6 dollar at 1900 US dollar and foreign direct investment as percent of domestic capital stock was 9%.Presently,India's FDI inflows is very low in comparison to other countries ,e.g. in 2017 , India's FDI was accounted as 1.9% of GDP and government of India expects it to rise to 2.5% of GDP with in next five years. In 2017, Mauritius was the top donor country to India comprising 11.47 billion US Dollar followed by Singapore 5.29 billion US Dollar, Netherlands 1.95 billion US Dollar, USA 1.33 billion US Dollar and Germany 934 million US Dollar respectively. As on 2017, Service sector is leading the sectoral distribution of FDI i.e. 8.68 billion US Dollar followed by telecommunication 5.56 billion US Dollar, Computer hardware and software 3.65 billion US Dollar, Trading 2.34 billion US Dollar, Automobile 1.61 billion US Dollar, and Metallurgical industry 1.44 billion US Dollar respectively. During the era of globalization and liberalization, India is following 100 % liberalization in FDI inflows in several sectors of the economy. India is not the exceptional country from where global financial crises did not enter and affect negatively like other developed and developing countries. Foreign direct investment flows also affected due to financial crises in Indian economy which is a great content of research in relating to other macro fundamentals.
On this overview, author tried to verify nexus between FDI inflows and growth in Indian economy using econometric analysis and studied analytically the changes of FDI flows during crises.
Africa, although the magnitude of this effect depends on some country specific features during 1996-2010 of 31 SSA countries of panel data where role of governance should positive on encouraging FDI inflows.
Objective of the paper
In this paper, author tried to find relation of foreign direct investment inflows with macro determinants like growth rate, interest rate, exchange rate, inflation rate, fiscal deficit, openness in India during 1971-2015 through causality, co-integration and vector error correction models along with other residual tests. Even, author found out the trends and structural shifts of foreign direct investment inflows in India during the same period. In this paper, it was attempted to explain clearly that how foreign direct investment inflows and outflows have changed during several financial crises in different regions of the world since 1970s in support with a historical analysis over global financial crises. In this context, the limitations of the paper, future scope of research and some policy prescriptions have been placed for forthcoming discussions.
Methodology and data
Assume,x1=GDP growth rate per cent per year,x2=interest rate per cent per year(discount rate),x3=exchange rate of rupee per US dollar,x4=inflation rate(per cent change of CPI),x5=fiscal deficit per cent of GDP,x6=external debt per cent of GDP,x7= trade openness per cent ,y= FDI inflows in India in million US dollar. Data have been collected from the World Bank, and International Financial Statistics of IMF from 1971 to 2015.Semi-log and exponential regression models were applied to calculate trends. Granger (1969) model was applied to test causality. Bai-Perron model (2003) was applied to find structural breaks of the foreign direct investment inflows in India. For co-integration test and vector error correction analysis we used Johansen (1988 Johansen ( , 1996 methodologies. We used Hansen-Doornik (1994) test for normality.
Economic growth-foreign direct investment nexus: A Case Study of India. Observations from the Econometric models
India's FDI inflows have been increasing at the 21.56% per year during 1971-2015 which is significant at 5% level.
Log(y)=1.4485+0.215672t In Figure 1 , the actual and fitted trend lines have been plotted. The fitted line is steeply rising upward. The exponential fitted trend line of Indian FDI inflows during 1971-2015 is also significant and it is exponentially rising at the rate 0.6044% per year. Table 1 , the significant values are given. In Figure 3 , the successive four upward breaks have been plotted in the fitted line showing actual line and residual lines of FDI inflows in terms of log. Granger causality test assured that there are no causality between FDI (y1) and openness(x7), but there exists uni-directional causality between FDI and fiscal deficit (x5), and there are bi-directional causality among FDI and inflation(x4),FDI and exchange rate(x3) and FDI and interest rate (x2), FDI inflows and growth rate (x1) respectively during 1971-2015 .In Table- 2,the results of Granger causality test are given. This observation is similar to the studies of Sarbapriya Ray (2012). Since the variables are co-integrated, then the estimated vector error correction model is given below. The study of VECM was also tested by Dash & Parida (2013) and in India. This VECM is good fit for equations [1] Δx1t, [2] Δx2t and [7] Δx7t. The speed of the vector error correction process is more or less slow except for Δx2t and Δx4t which are significant. Δx2t has been correcting the error by 23.16% per year and Δx4t has been correcting the error by 102.55% per year respectively.
Yet this VECM is stable since it has 10 roots in which six roots are imaginary (0.518961 ± 0.209573i, -0.308760 ± 0.428752i, -0.165298 ± 0.346439i), one root is one and other three roots (-0.543200, 0.328063, 0.138599) are less than one, all of which lie in the unit circle. It is shown in the Figure 4 . The Impulse Response Functions of VECM have been diverging away from equilibrium which means that exogenous shocks do not turn the model into equilibrium. It is shown in Figure 5 (response of x1 , x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7 ,y to Cholesky one SD innovations).These lines are moving away from zero. It means that the VECM is non-stationary. Source-Plotted by author.
Residual tests of this VECM assure that the residuals have the problem of autocorrelations which is shown in Figure 6 . Cor(Y,Y(-i))
Autocorrelations with 2 Std.Err. Bounds Figure 6 . Autocorrelations problem Source-Plotted by author
The Serial correlation LM test of the residuals of the Vector Error Correction Model suggested that the variables are serially correlated which is seen in the Table 4 . The VEC residual normality test as done by Hansen-Doornik (1994) methodology has shown that the joint components of Kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are significant but most of the other components of Skewness, Kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are not significant according to the values of Chi-square distribution, therefore, the residuals are not multivariate normal. In Table 5 , their values are given. 
Analytical framework of financial crises and FDI
Capital inflows played a great role in financial crises in which foreign direct investment is of primary importance because current account imbalance during financial crises is somehow corrected through capital inflows or huge foreign direct investment for getting boosting output and growth. A 1% increase in FDI/GDP ratio is followed by a 0.80% increase in future domestic investment/GDP in Africa. The anticipated decline crisis would therefore adversely affect the country's performance. (Mwega, 2009) In 1914, total foreign investment of USA (FI = FDI + FPI) was 19.5% of GNP while FDI was 4.7%. By 1918, the total (FI) was down to 3.9% while FDI was 1.3%. The 1920s did not change these percentages very much but the 1930s raised them so that by 1939 they stood at 6.8-9.6% and 3.2%, respectively. By the end of World War II, total FI was 3.7% and FDI was 1.3%. Wilkins's rich account of foreign investment in the U.S. is also a major part of the story of the retreat from the pre-World War I high-tide of globalization. (Wilkins,2005) In the post war period, British and France lost foreign investment amounting in all to somewhere between 4 and 5 billion dollars i.e. approximately 25% of British and 50% of French prewar foreign investment although in 1914,34 countries (10 developed and 24 less developed countries) produced 97% of world GDP and received 92% of British capital which spread into wider area and moved to Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Egypt, South Africa, India, Russia and Far East. During and after the War Germany lost practically all her foreign investment amounting to sum 5-8 billion dollars. After the first world war, British foreign investment in third world was stagnant, the Netherlands, Belgium and Japan all expanded their investment into their colonies rather continually up to world war II, while not having appreciable FDI in the rest of the third world. (Twomey,2002) In 1915, the British FDI was 43 million pound which increased to 110 million pound in 1916 and then started to decline and stood 60 million pound in 1917 and 23 million pound in 1918 respectively. On the other hand, during 1924-30, 10-11 billion dollar capital flowed in the world in which 60% came from USA, 15% from UK and France and balance from Switzerland, Netherland, Czechoslovakia and Sweden respectively. In the 1930s the crisis was global because the great depression was global. Assuming 1929 as 100, the world trade index fell to 39, export value and import price declined to 74 and 52 respectively and world industry production, In Figure 7 , the judgement index of extent of capital mobility is measured in the left vertical axis and is marked by red line. More or less similar pattern of foreign investment had been observed in different international monetary system during 1860-2000 where the gold standard had enjoyed the maximum benefit from the foreign investment as was evident in 1900s but there was a sharp fall of the foreign investment in all the financial crises as observed in the monetary systems (Figure 8 ). In the gold standard during 1860-1914, Britain's supremacy of FDI flows in the world was noticed and the Gold Standard broke down in 1931.The War and the depression in the interwar period there was the great fall of world FDI flows although US FDI outflows began to increase. After the Bretton Woods, the FDI flows started to increase speedily where US dominance could not be ignored but Japan's hegemony in 80s and 90s is the important phenomenon when floating exchange rate in the international monetary system was activised after the break down of Bretton Woods and US dominance in foreign capital started to decline due to emergence of capital flows from Euro Area under European Monetary System (Also see Bhowmik, 2016). FDI inflows declined only in the Developing and SAARC countries and outflows of FDI declined only in NAFTA and no other countries or blocs had no major adverse impact as a result of Financial crisis in 1970.The oil shock of 1979 along with Mexican crisis had a great impact of declining donor countries FDI flows but the developed countries shortfall of inflows were seen only in 1980 but no adverse impact of FDI inflows was observed (Table 6 ). Asian financial crisis and Japanese banking crisis broke out in mid 1990s where depreciation of currencies, decline of growth rate and employment, shuttered financial integration and disrupted capital flows. But the impact of this crisis in EU, USA, Africa was nil in case of FDI inflows but there is little impact of FDI inflows in China, India, Asia and South East Asia where inflows declined from 1998 in China and India, and declined only in 1998 in South Asia, East Asia and South East Asia. On the contrary, Japanese FDI outflows fell down sharply since 1997 and Chinese FDI outflows fell down only in 1999 but India's outflows declined from 1997. Other regional outflows were undisturbed. (Table 8 ). 7306  1996  183180  84424  2114  244  23442  28  49683  2273  5549  1997  220416  95769  2563  113  26059  1708  49482  -281  14391  1998  454266  131004  2634  48  24152  897  29985  -1698  8048  1999  720052  142551  1775  79  22743  632  34447  656  21753  2000  772949  139259  2324  336  32886  744  83641  1284  13442 Source-World Investment Report-2001.
The first indications of a global financial crisis emerged in the middle of 2007 with rising defaults on subprime mortgages in the U.S. Not only private financial institutions (such as Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley), but even nations (such as Iceland) found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. As financial institutions have been increasingly forced to raise capital and tackle the liquidity problem, decreasing international bank lending, falling stock exchanges, declining portfolio investment, and initial public offerings (IPOs) put the international financial market on hold.
Subsequently, Euro debt crisis began and spill over globally which had tremendous adverse impact on current account balance, output and financial market too in EU and abroad. International liquidity on Euro fell down and FDI flows declined abruptly (Bhowmik,2014) .
Global FDI hit a record peak in 2007 (2 trillion US$ or 16% of world gross fixed capital formation) but dropped sharply in 2008 for both inward and outward FDI flows (34% for outflows and 52% for inflows). While incoming FDI flows recovered slightly in 2009 and EU FDI outflows continued to decline by 24% and total world flows in 2010 reduced to 1 trillion US$. In Table 9, FDI inflows It was also well known that the growth rates of developed countries and the EU declined during the crisis. The revival of EU has started in last year after collapse of Euro crisis. Conversely the extent of decrease in GDP growth rates was smaller in some Asian countries than Europe and America. In Figure 9 , the global FDI flows and growth moved towards the similar direction downward since the crisis but there was no recovery of FDI although the growth started to recover. 
Limitations of the study
There are many determinants of FDI in the economy as suggested by existing literature available as on now, in which author has not included the following factors namely,(i) Market Size(ii) Portfolio Diversification(iii) Resource Location(iv) Differential Rate of Return(v) Foreign Exchange Reserves(vi) Internationalization (vii) Government Regulations(viii) Political Stability(ix) Tax Policies(x) Industrial Organization (xi) technology ,(xii) human capital respectively. The choice variables depend on the needs of the economy. Some of the determinants are lag variables. Therefore, a single model cannot forecast all the relationships nor co-integration analysis is sufficient to explain qualitative and quantitative importance of the variables. Even, the models that are framed clearly are country specific and time dependent. Besides, the host countries' behavior of FDI inflows in the developing countries are rather different than the developed countries.
Scope of Future research
There is huge scope of further research in the area. One can find root causes of banking crisis, currency crisis and sovereign debt crisis and can relate with growth either in a specific country or in regions during long period of time. How monetary and fiscal policies affect on those crises can be analyzed. One can highlight the Concept of Political economy of those crises. Above all, the periodical differences are very much importance in these fields. The paper demands historic and academic interests as well. More analysis can be done in the cases where FDI decline in every financial crisis regionally or sub-regionally. Even, why China and other East Asian countries did not react negatively too much in recent crises is to be an added future studies.
In this model, FDI inflows in India had no causal relation with the openness during the study period whose inherent causes are to be searched in the offing. How far historical domination of FDI in India has changed is the important area of research in context of the paper. The paper also concludes that FDI does not cause Granger financial crises but financial crises do cause Granger FDI. In every financial crisis since 1890, FDI changes downward but in Euro crises and US subprime crises, FDI did not decline in most of the East Asian countries. The declining growth and FDI in all financial crises were the general phenomenon. Also in India, financial crises had negative impact on FDI and growth.
Some recommended policies
In concluding remarks we like to mention that a country which has a stable macroeconomic condition with high and sustained growth rates will receive higher FDI inflows than a more volatile economy. Therefore, it is expected that GDP growth rate, industrial production, and interest rates would influence FDI flows positively and the inflation rate would influence positively or negatively. Market size plays an important role in attracting foreign direct investment from abroad. Market size is measured by GDP. Market size tend to influence the inflows, as an increased customer base signifies more opportunities of being successful and also the fact that with the rampant development the purchasing power of the people has also been greatly influenced moving to many levels higher in comparison to what it was before the economic growth.
